John Searle's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech R. Searle - - Philosophical Review 91 (3) Expression and Meaning. First, intentionality has nothing in particular to do with intending, or intentions. Intentions must be sharply distinguished from intensionality (intensionality-with-an-s) (Searle , ch. 1). .. In Having Thought, by John Haugeland, Consciousness and intentionality can seem to pervade much or all of .. On John Searle's conception, intentional states are states Consciousness and · Intentionality and the · Why It Matters.
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But there is a fair amount of fragmentation in the conceptions of intentionality in the field, and the complexities just mentioned cannot be ignored.
In the interests of such ecumenical breadth, it will be useful to conduct an overview of the near history of thinking about intentionality, covering important ideas arising both in the phenomenological john searle intentionality from the late 19th to midth john searle intentionality, and in the area of research that in the last half century or so has come to be known as philosophy of mind.
John Searle, Intentionality - PhilPapers
Nevertheless, the history of influence and dialogue linking figures in the phenomenological movement with one another, and that unifying the analytic tradition, yield largely distinct narratives. This, together with the differences in approach, vocabulary, and background assumptions, make some disjoint john searle intentionality of the two inevitable.
However, it seems fitting to try to encompass both in a single article.
For, as will be seen, there are significant thematic commonalities across the two histories, and the differences and similarities john searle intentionality how these themes are treated in each may john searle intentionality revealing and intellectually stimulating.
Consciousness and Intentionality in Phenomenology A history of ideas about consciousness and intentionality could easily take us further into the past than this article can cover.
A convenient, relatively recent starting point would be in the philosophy of Franz Brentano. Brentano himself was quite aware of the deep historical background to his notion of intentionality: In this section, we will review how Brentano conceived of intentionality and consciousness, and their relationship, and how that conception was transformed in the thought of his student Husserl—whose name is that most strongly associated with the phenomenological movement—and in the writings of some of those he strongly influenced.
John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind - PhilPapers
This will allow us to introduce the three themes mentioned in the introduction—detachability, basic forms, and reflexivity—by which one might unify the disparate discussions of consciousness and intentionality arising over roughly the last century. In a famous passage, he introduces the john searle intentionality this way.
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional or mental inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference [or relation] to a content, direction toward john searle intentionality object which is not to be understood as a john searle intentionalityor immanent objectivity.
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
He complained of being misunderstood by his students, and he revised his position as his thought developed.
Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Experts continue to differ considerably over john searle intentionality to interpret his view. But clearly his conception of intentionality, and arguably that of the whole phenomenological tradition he influenced, is dominated by the first strand of thought mentioned in Section 2—intentionality as directedness towards or reference to an object—and whatever difficulties that brings in train.
All intentionality, he holds, involves a presentation Vorstellung in some sense, an john searle intentionality of an object including mere imaginings or conceivings of objects.
How did Brentano relate john searle intentionality to intentionality? Brentano did not consider it absurd to suppose there are unconscious for him, unperceived mental acts. But he found inadequate such reasons as had been offered in his time to posit their occurrence.
On his view, wherever this is proposed on the grounds of explanatory usefulness, nonmentalistic e. In this connection, he also took seriously the worry that if we hold as he does that all mental acts are conscious, and all conscious acts are objects of consciousness, an infinite regress would erupt.
But he thought his theory could john searle intentionality the problem: Of these, it was Husserl who was to have the widest philosophical impact on the European Continent in the twentieth century, largely because of his influence on thinkers inspired by his phenomenology to explore existentialist themes—Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Though these are the heirs of Brentano and Husserl on which we will focus here, a full treatment of phenomenological ideas about intentionality and consciousness would need to cast john searle intentionality net much more broadly, covering figures such as: First, consider his response to Brentano on intentionality.